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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is based upon the Court's
granting of the plaintiff Mounteerfs Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to review the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals,
Percy Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 107 Utah Adv. Rpt.
71, 773 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1989).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Defendant UP&L is dissatisfied with the Mounteer's
statement of the issues presented

for review.

As the

Complaint was dismissed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the
issue

for

review

necessarily

allegations and inferences.

arises

from

its

factual

The Complaint alleges that one

employee, Nicki Larsen, intentionally defamed a co-employee,
Percy Mounteer, and intentionally caused Mounteer emotional
distress.
not

UP&L employed both Larsen and Mounteer.

intend,

direct,

participate

intentional tortious conduct.

nor

ratify

UP&L did
Larsenfs

In fact, this intentional

tortious conduct violated UP&L policies. Mounteer sustained
injury to his psychological, mental and emotional well-being;
suffered

post-traumatic

depression,

all

of

which

stress

disorder,

required

anguish

psychiatric

and

hospital

treatment; and permanently and totally disabled him from
employment.

1

Thus, under the alleged facts, the issue is: Has Mounteer
stated a cause of action for damages against his employer for
these injuries?
Like that of the trial court, the standard for this
Court's review is, construing the complaint in the light most
favorable

to

the plaintiff

and

indulging

all

reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff
would be* entitled to relief under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of the claim.

Burnett v. Utah

Power & Light Co.. No. 880369, filed September 4, 1990, and
cases cited therein. Indulging reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff applies only to the facts and not to the
conclusions of law.

See Kohen v. H.S. Crocker Co.. 260 F2d

790 (5th Cir. 1958).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The interpretation of §35-1-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988) is
determinative of the issue on appeal:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by
an employee, whether resulting in death or not,
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer
and

shall

be

the

exclusive

remedy

against

any

officer, agent or employee of the employer and the
liabilities of the employer imposed by this act
shall

be

in place

of

any
2

and

all

other

civil

liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise,
to such employee or to his spouse, widow, children,
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal
representatives,

guardian,

or

any

other

person

whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or
death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated
or incurred by such employee in the course of or
because of or arising out of his employment, and no
action at law may be maintained against an employer
or against any officer, agent or employee of the
employer based upon any accident, injury or death
of an employee.

Nothing in this section, however,

shall prevent an employee (or his dependents) from
filing a claim with the industrial commission of
Utah for compensation
provisions

of

the

in those cases within the
Utah

Occupational

Disease

Disability Act, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
UP&L is dissatisfied with the Plaintiff's statement of
the case.

UP&L's statement is as follows:

On October 6, 1986, Mounteer was an employee of UP&L as
was Larsen.

Mounteer, while on the job, and at the hands of

Larsen who was also on the job, suffered mental and emotional
trauma at that time, as well as an aggravation of a jobrelated mental trauma suffered two years earlier.

3

Mounteerfs

Complaint alleged causes of action for defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.

UP&L's Motion to Dismiss, U.R.C.P.

12(b)(6), was granted without prejudice on August 17, 1987.
Record at Pages 10 & 107. (Hereinafter the Record will be
cited as R.

).

While the Motion to Dismiss was under advisement,
Mounteer sought to file an Amended Complaint.

R. 41 & 103.

Following the entry of the Judgment of Dismissal, the trial
court, sua sponte, struck as moot the Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend the Complaint.
Mounteer presented to the trial court all of the probable
state of facts in support of his claim. The fatal defects in
Mounteer's pleadings, as identified by the trial court, were
incorporated
Plaintiff's

into the Order of Dismissal.
Objections, R.

123; Order

Order Upon

and

Judgment

of

and

Judgment

of

Dismissal, R. 125.
The
Dismissal

Plaintiff

appealed

the

Order

to the Utah Supreme Court which transferred the

appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals

issued its opinion affirming the trial court's dismissal in
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 107 Utah Adv. Rpt. 71, 773
P.2d 405 (Utah App.1989). (Hereinafter Mounteer) .

A copy of

the Court of Appeals opinion is attached hereto as Appendix
A.
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Mounteer then filed with this Court a Petition for Writ
of Certiorari claiming that the injuries suffered by Mounteer
were not compensable under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act
and, therefore, not barred from a civil suit against the
employer by §35-1-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988) . The Petition for
Writ of Certiorari was granted by this Court on June 5, 1990.
The following are the facts alleged in the Complaint:
1.

At all times relevent to the Mounteer's

claim,

Mounteer and Larsen were employees of UP&L and were acting in
the course and scope of their employment.

Complaint 5f 3, 4,

5 & 7; R. 2, 3 & 4.
2.

UP&L instructed Larsen to "investigate" Mounteer for

drug use according to UP&L's specific policies for such an
investigation.
3.

Larsen's conduct which injured Mounteer violated

those policies.
4.

Complaint 5J 7 & 16, R. 4 & 5.

Complaint 55 7 & 16, R. 4 & 5.

Larsen's conduct was intentional, grossly negligent,

malicious, outrageous and reckless. Complaint 55 17, 19 & 21,
R. 5 & 6.
5.
inferred

Mounteer makes no allegation from which it can be
that

UP&L

intended,

directed,

participated

or

ratified Larsen's intentional tortious acts.
6.

Mounteer has conceded that under no state of the

alleged facts can it be proven that UP&L intended, directed,
participated or ratified Larsen's intentional tortious acts.

5

Transcript of July 31, 1987, Hearing Upon Motion to Dismiss,
Page 15, Line 9-16 & 23-24 R. 164; Page 16, Line 10-12, R.
165; Page 18, Line 13-20, R. 167.
7.

As

the

result

of

Larsen's

intentional torts,

Mounteer suffered severe mental and emotional damage requiring
psychiatric

hospital

treatment.

Additionally, he suffered

Complaint

f

10.

severe aggregation of a post-

traumatic stress disorder, permanently and totally disabling
him from employment.

Complaint f 11.

Mounteer sought

recovery of the substantial medical costs and expenses which
he incurred and expected to incur.
8.

Complaint 5 12 & 18.

Only in the prayer for relief does Mounteer request

damages for embarrctssment and damage to his reputation.
Complaint Prayer for Relief 5 2.

In Paragraph 1 to the

Prayer, the Plaintiff requests "for judgment for slander, in
the amount of $500,000, or such other sum as may be proved,
for permanent, total disability due to post-traumatic stress
disorder."

Complaint Prayer for Relief f 1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As he did before the trial court and before the Court of
Appeals, Mounteer again ignores the "key fact that he was
Larsen's fellow employee when he was allegedly injured in the
course of his employment by Larsen's performance of her
assigned task and refuses to acknowledge that the workers'
compensation statute has reshaped an employer's liability in
6

such circumstances." Mounteer at 407. Mounteer1s claim must
be analyzed in light of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act
which defines the employee's rights and the employer's
obligations in cases of injuries suffered on the job.

When

so analyzed, it is apparent that Mounteer does not state a
cause of action against UP&L.

UP&L did not act, or fail to

act, in any manner which lifts the bar to civil suit in §351-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988) . UP&L did not act, or fail to act,
in any manner which makes UP&L liable for Larsen's intentional
torts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. regardless
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
event was an accident.

The injury-causing

Finally, the entirety of Mounteer's

injuries are compensable under the Utah Workers1 Compensation
Act.
ARGUMENT
I.

MOUNTEER ALLEGES NO ACTIONABLE CONDUCT OR OMISSION BY

UP&L
Mounteer acknowledges an absence of any fact or inference
that UP&L caused or contributed to the injury-causing event
of October 6, 1986, or to his injuries. The sole basis of his
claim against UP&L is that UP&L employed Larsen.

Were the

analysis to stop there, the Complaint would withstand a Motion
to Dismiss. However, when one adds the additional fact that
Mounteer also was employed by UP&L and the injury occurred
while both Mounteer and Larsen were on the job, then UP&L's
only connection to the injury-causing event or the injury
7

itself

is as an employer.

UP&L's

obligation

is thus

exclusively governed by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act and
Mounteer's civil suit is barred.

§35-1-60 Utah Code Ann.

(1988) .
If the employment relationship is the only connection
between the employer to an employee's injury, then workers'
compensation is the exclusive remedy against the employer.
In Bryan v. Utah Intern'tl, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975), this
Court held that while an employee is not protected by the
exclusivity provision of workers' compensation from a separate
action at law for damages resulting from the intentional
injury of a co-employee, the employer must be shown to have
some connection to the injury other than merely the status of
employer, i.e. to have directed or intended the injurious act
or the injury, before the employee may also sue the employer.
In Mounteer, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled upon this
issue by stating:
According to Mounteer's own allegations, he was
indisputably injured by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment. He was thus clearly barred by
the statute from bringing a negligence action at law
against either Larsen or UP&L.
His allegations
concerning Larsen's intentional conduct, however, were
sufficient to state a direct tort claim against her that
was not barred by the exclusivity provision in Section
35-1-60, but she was not made a defendant, and UP&L
cannot be liable at law for Larsen's intentional acts
merely by operation of vicarious liability. Mounteer.
at 407-408.

8

Even if Mounteer was not UP&L's employee, he must allege
facts which would establish that UP&L itself acted or failed
to act in a manner which caused his injury since without such
facts UP&L is not liable for the intentional torts of its
employee Larsen.
In fact, Mounteer portrays UP&L as purely passive to
Larsen's intentional torts. He does not and indeed cannot in
good faith allege that UP&L itself spoke, hired Larsen to
speak, or ratified her speech.
Larsen

acted

contrary

Mounteer acknowledges that

to UP&L's direction

embodied in UP&L's policies.

and

intent as

Complaint 1 7, R. 4.

UP&L is

not, as a matter of law, liable for Larsen's defamatory words.
Therefore, under no state of facts as could be proven in
support of Mounteer's claim, did he state a cause of action
against UP&L and the Complaint was properly dismissed.
II.

FROM UP&L'S PERSPECTIVE, THE DECEMBER 1984 WILBERG MINE

FIRE AND THE EVENT

OCTOBER 6, 1986, WERE ACCIDENTS.

Mounteer devotes much of his brief to the argument that
defamation is not an accident within the meaning of §35-1-60
Utah Code Ann. (1988) . But the facts alleged compel a finding
that, as to UP&L, whose point of view is the reference point
from which this judgment is made, the Wilberg Mine fire and
Larsen's acts on October 6, 1986, and the injuries which
befell Mounteer were accidental.

9

The Utah

Court

of Appeals

cited

as controlling

the

definition of "accident" in Allen v. Industrial Commfn., 729
P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 1986) which held that an accident is an
unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the
cause of an injury or the result of an injury.
408, ft. note 3.

Mounteer at

Thus, an intentional act resulting in an

unintentional and unforeseeable injury is an accident.
Allen further defines accident as a causal connection
between the injury and injured worker's employment duties.
Id. at 22.

Such a connection is found throughout

Complaint.

Mounteer's

Mounteer attributes his fragile mental state to

the Wilberg Mine fire of December 1984 and he further claims
his complete mental destruction by Larsen's acts of October
6, 1986.

He directly relates

his injury to his employment

duties by claiming a permanent and total disability

from

employment.

In fact, except for an ambiguous reference to

reputational

injury

in

the

Prayer

for

Relief,1

Mounteer

describes the injury-causing event, the injury itself, and the
results of the injury to be as severe an employment related
personal injury as the loss of a limb, being rendered blind
or disfigured from a defective piece of machinery.

All of the

events described in the Complaint are, to UP&L, the

1

A mere naked prayer unsupported by affirmative allegations
cannot aid a defective pleading. In re Somers' Estate, 187
P.2d 433, 435 (Cal App 1947). A prayer for relief forms no
part of the cause of action. Campbell v. Benson. 637 P.2d
578, 582 (N.M. 1981).
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unexpected or unintended cause of injury or result of injury
contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred in the course
of, or because of, or arising out of Mounteer's employment.
Further, it does not matter that the cause of the injury
was the intentional tortious act of Mounteer's co-worker.

As

this Court has recognized in Brvan v. Utah Intern'tl. 533 P.2d
892

(Utah

1975) , the

reality

of

the

workplace

is

that

employees do not always conduct themselves as the employer
wishes or in accord with the employer's policies.
employees

may

intentional

deviate

from

their

duties

At times,

and

injurious conduct of many forms.

engage

in

Unless the

employer intended or directed this deviation, to the employer
the injury caused by the intentional conduct is "one more
industrial mishap in the factory," for which the employer is
not liable.

Larson, Workmens' Compensation Law, §68.21 at

13-74.
Accordingly, under any state of facts which Mounteer
could prove in support of his claim, the cause of his injuries
and the results of his injuries were as to UP&L an accident.
His claim is barred and the Motion to Dismiss was properly
granted.
III. MOUNTEER'S CLAIM IS FOR INJURIES WHICH ARE COMPENSABLE
UNDER THE UTAH WORKERS1 COMPENSATION ACT.
In

the

Complaint,

Mounteer

describes

his

injuries

exclusively as injuries which are compensable under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act.

Mounteer's involvement in the

11

Wilberg Mine fire set a stage of mental stress which Larsen's
intentional tortious acts aggravated to a state of disabling
mental and emotional injury, requiring hospitalization.

He

incurred extensive medical costs and anticipates substantial
future medical costs.
Mounteer described his injuries in his Complaint, before
the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals, as personal
injuries consisting of mental trauma, distress and emotional
disorders.

All

of Mounteer's

allegations

emphasize

the

physical and mental character of the injuries, relating them
to a series of specific, stressful, work-related incidents.
The root cause of Mounteer's injuries was his involvement in
the Wilberg Mine disaster of December 1984.
October

6,

1986,

was

an

aggravating

The incident of

continuum

of

that

stressful event. Construing the allegations in the light most
favorable to Mounteer and indulging all reasonable inferences
in his favor, one may conclude only that the injuries of which
Mounteer complains are compensable under the Utah Workers1
Compensation Act.
Mounteer's Brief cites a series of cases which hold that
to

determine

whether

a

civil

action

is

barred

by

the

exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation law requires
an injury-oriented analysis.
. . . the key to whether the Workmen's Compensation
Act precludes a common law right of action lies in
the nature of the injury for which plaintiff makes
claim, not the nature of the defendant's act which
plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that
injury.
Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football
12

Club, 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo. App. 1978); Accord,
Foley v. Polaroid Corp.. 413 N.E.2d 711 (Mass. Supr.
1980) ; Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286
(Del. Super. 1982^.
Thus, if the nature of the injury complained of is an
accidental, personal injury, it is compensable and an action
against the employer is precluded, regardless of the nature
of the act.

In this case, defamation is the act which is

alleged to have been responsible for the personal injury.
Damage to reputation
personal

injury

and

is

is a proprietary
not

barred

by

rather than a

the

exclusivity

provisions of workers1 compensation laws. Battista, supra at
289.

Mounteerfs claim is exclusively for personal injuries

which have a medical identity, physical and mental impact, and
are medically treated.
The trial court inquired if Mounteer had filed a workers1
compensation claim for such a claim would be decisive that the
Motion to Dismiss should be granted. R. 10 & 11. Such a claim
was filed and his attending physician described his injuries
as being uninterrupted from the December 1984 Wilberg Mine
fire just as Mounteer alleges in his Complaint.

Mounteer!s

workers' compensation claim was ultimately denied because of
his failure to cooperate. R. 10 & 11; Appendix B.
Mounteer

filed

a

second

claim

with

the

Industrial

Commission of Utah in which he claims that the sole result of
the slander was "post-dramatic [sic] stress disorder and other
emotional problems which have made him permanently and totally

13

disabled."

Claim

for

Protection

of

Rights,

Industrial

Commission of Utah, filed June 14, 1989. A copy of this claim
is attached hereto as Appendix C.2
Mounteer's pleadings, his oral argumcmt before the trial
court and the Utah Court of Appeals, and his pleadings filed
in connection with his clients to the Industrial Commission
of Utah, all describe his injuries as injuries which are
compensable

under

the

Utah

Workers'

Compensation

Act.

Accordingly, his claim against UP&L based solely upon UP&L's
status as employer and not upon any active participation or
involvement in the accident, is absolutely barred by §35-160 Utah Code Ann. (1988).

CONCLUSION
Mounteer has characterized his injury as personal and,
therefore, compensable under workers' compensation
Complaint and claim to the Industrial Commission.

2

in his
Appendix

Mounteer's Claim for Protection of Rights to the Industrial
Commission of Utah filed June 12, 1989, was filed after the
Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion affirming the trial
court's Dismissal. This Court should consider this Pleading
in its review of the correctness of the Utah Court of Appeals
opinion and the trial court's dismissal of Mounteer's
Complaint, utah R.App.p.ll(h) allows this Court by motion or sua
sponte. ei-cner oerore or after the Record on Appeal is
transmitted, to correct omissions of material matters.
A key to the just decision by this Court is the nature of
Mounteer's injuries. The workers' compensation claims are
critical to that just decision. UP&L respectfully requests
that Appendix B and C be incorporated into the Record on
Appeal.

14

C.

Before this Court, he argues the injury was purely

proprietary.

It is the Complaint which frames the cause of

action scrutinized by the courts below and which is before
this Court.

Compensable personal injury is the heart of

Mounteerfs claim as was recognized by the trial court and the
Utah Court of Appeals. Their decisions reflect an application
of Utah law to the facts as plead, not the facts as Mounteer
would like them to be.

Their decisions are also based upon

the prohibition of a double recovery one under workers1
compensation, the second in an action at law.

Foley v.

Polaroid Corp., 423 N.W.2d at 716, ft. note 6.
Mounteer's claim for proprietary damages is, at best,
peripheral to his personal injury claim.

Even by indulging

all responsible inferences in Mounteer's favor does not save
his claim against UP&L.

As a purely passive party, related

to the injury-causing event and to the injury solely as the
employer, UP&L is entitled to a dismissal.

All attempts to

mold this case into something else distorts the integrity of
the exclusivity provisions of the Utah Workers' Compensation
Act.

The rulings of the trial court and Court of Appeals

should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 8th day of October, 1990.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Paul H. Proctor

15
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MOUNTEER v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO.

Utah

405

Cite at 773 ?2d 4 fl (UUhApp. 1989)

that he discovered or should have discovered the alleged misconduct by September
1982, but his notice of intent to bring this
action was not filed until November 1985.
Therefore, we hold that his claim was
barred by the one year statute of limitations set forth in section 78-14-4(l)(b). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for
defendants.
Finally, Floyd asserts that the special
statute of limitations contained in the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act violates the
equal protection clause of the United
States and Utah Constitutions. However,
Floyd failed to raise this issue in the trial
court proceedings or preserve it on the
record, and we decline to consider the issue
for the first time on appeal. James v.
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah CtApp.
1987).
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur.

(O

| KEY NUMBER SYST£M>

Percy MOUNTEER, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 880189-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 2, 1989.
Employee appealed from final order
and judgment of the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, J.,
dismissing without prejudice his complaint
against employer arising out of security
guard's alleged intentional broadcasting
over public-address system that employee
was using drugs. The Court of Appeals,
Jackson, J., held that: (1) exclusive remedy
provision of Workmen's Compensation Law

barred employee from bringing negligence
action against either security guard or employer, and (2) employer was not liable for
guard's intentional acts, absent allegation
that it directed or intended those acts.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error <s=*919
In reviewing dismissal for failure to
state claim, appellate court must construe
complaint in light most favorable to plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in
plaintiffs favor.
2. Pretrial Procedure <3=>624
Dismissal for failure to state claim is
appropriate only where it appears to certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief under any state of facts which could
be proved in support of claims asserted.
3. Workers' Compensation <&=»2168
Employee suffering compensable injury cannot maintain action at law against
fellow employee who was merely negligent
or an employer as vicariously liable principal; instead workers' compensation provides exclusive remedy to injured employee. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45, 35-1-60.
4. Workers' Compensation <s=*2168
Employee who, in course of and scope
of his or her employment, intentionally acts
to injure co-worker is not protected by exclusive remedy provision of Workmen's
Compensation Law from separate action at
law for damages, but in such a case employer is liable only to extent of workers'
compensation benefits unless injurious act
was directed or intended by employer.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60.
5. Workers' Compensation <s»514
For purposes of workers' compensation, "accident" is unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either cause or
result of injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

6. Master and Servant <3=>306
Employer was not vicariously liable for
intentional, injurious acts of security
APPENDIX A
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guards investigating employee's suspected
drug use, absent allegation that employer
intended or directed those acts, which were
allegedly in violation of company policy;
guard announced on open-page system connected to loudspeakers that employee was
on drugs and persisted in making those
allegations despite being advised that announcement was being broadcast on public
address system.

Robert B. Sykes, M. Gale Lemmon, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Robert Gordon, Paul H. Proctor, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
Before BENCH, GARFF and
JACKSON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION

sisted and continued to make allegations
to the effect that plaintiff was on drugs.
These false statements, which Mounteer
claimed were either intentionally, recklessly, or negligently made by Larsen, resulted
in severe mental and emotional damage
that, in turn, resulted in Mounteer's hospitalization and the aggravation of his posttraumatic stress disorder, rendering him
totally disabled from employment.
Mounteer did not sue Larsen, and made
no allegations of any negligent or intentional injurious acts by UP & L directly.
Instead, he sought to hold UP & L vicariously liable in damages for the acts of its
agent, Larsen, under three asserted causes
of action. The first was for slander for the
unprivileged publication of false and defamatory statements, which, "in fact, was
in violation of the company's procedures
with respect to allegations of drug
use
" The second and third causes of
action were for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. He requested reimbursement for medical expenses, and damages for permanent total
disability, suffering, and damage to reputation.

JACKSON, Judge:
Percy Mounteer appeals from the final
order and judgment dismissing his complaint for failure to state a cause of action
against respondent Utah Power & Light
Company ("UP & L"). We affirm.
According to the June 1987 complaint
In the absence of any allegations that
filed in this action, Mounteer worked as a UP & L intended or directed Larsen's injuwarehouseman at UP & L's mine in Emery rious acts, which were allegedly in violation
County, Utah. He was under elevated of UP & L's policy, the trial court concludmental stress because of his involvement in ed UP & L could not be liable. Mounteer's
the December 1984 Wilburg mine disaster. complaint was dismissed without prejuNiki Larsen, a security guard for UP & L, dice.1
was instructed by her superiors at UP & L
to investigate Mounteer for suspected drug
[1,2] In reviewing a dismissal for failuse. UP & L had specific procedures to be ure to state a claim, this court must confollowed in such cases. On October 6, strue the complaint in the light most favor1986, Larsen came to the mine, briefly in- able to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonterviewed Mounteer at work, and
able inferences in plaintiffs favor. Arrow
in violation of company policy, and on an Indus, v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d
open-page system that was connected to 935, 936 (Utah 1988). Such a dismissal is
loudspeakers, knowingly communicated appropriate only where it appears to a certo many of defendant's other employees tainty that the plaintiff would not be entithat [Mounteer] was on drugs. When tled to relief under any state of facts which
advised by another of defendant's em- could be proved in support of the claims
ployees that it was being broadcast on asserted. Freegard v. First W. NaVl
the public-address system, Larsen per- Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987).
1. Because this ruling resolved the legal merits of
any cause Mounteer may frame against UP & L,
the order dismissing his complaint without prej-

udice is final for purposes of appeal. See
Bowles v. State ex rel Utah Dep't of Transp., 652
P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982).

MOUNTEER v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO.

Utah 407

Cite as 773 ?2d 405 (UuhApp. 1989)

Appellant avers that his is a textbook
case in which the employer should be vicariously liable, under the principle of respondeat superior, for the negligent or intentional acts of an employee/agent that injure a third party while that employee is
carrying out the employer's business and
acting within the scope of employment.
See, e.g., Birkner v. Salt Lake County,
771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989); Whitehead v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 101 Utah
Adv.Rep. 24 (1989); see also Johnson v.
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) (recognizing cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and enunciating standards for employer's vicarious liability to
third party for punitive damages awarded
against negligent employee).
We agree that, viewing Mounteer's allegations in a favorable light, as we must,
reasonable minds could conclude as a factual matter that Larsen was acting within the
scope of her employment under the criteria
enunciated in Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057,
when she made the allegedly defamatory
statements. However, the appropriate legal analysis does not stop here. Mounteer
ignores the additional key fact that he was
Larsen's fellow employee when he was allegedly injured in the course of his employment by Larsen's performance of her assigned task and refuses to acknowledge
that the workers' compensation statute has
reshaped an employer's liability in such
circumstances. See Masich v. United
States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co.,
113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, 615-17, appeal
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S.Ct 138, 93
L.Ed. 411 (1948); see generally 1 A. Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law
§§ 4.10-4.50 (1985).
[3] Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1988)
provides:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for
injuries sustained by an employee,
whether resulting in death or not, shall
be the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
2. This phrase was recently changed to "by accident arising out of and in the course of employ-

against any officer, agent, or employee
of the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this act shall be in
place of any and all other civil liability
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise,
to such employee . . . or any other person
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way
contracted, sustained, aggravated or
incurred by such employee in the
course of or because of or arising out of
his employment, and no action at law
may be maintained against an employer
or against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee
(Emphasis added.) If an employee suffers
a compensable injury, defined in Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-45 (1987) as one that occurs
by accident arising out of or in the course
of his employment,2 this section bars the
maintenance of an action at law against
either a fellow employee who is merely
negligent or the employer as a vicariously
liable principal. Instead, workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy to the
injured employee. E.g., Morrill v. J & M
Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981);
Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139,
442 P.2d 31 (1968); Masich, 191 P.2d at
616.
[4] On the other hand, an employee
who, in the course and scope of his or her
employment, intentionally acts to injure a
co-worker is not protected by this exclusivity provision from a separate action at law
for damages. Bryan v. Utah InVl, 533
P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). But, in such a case,
the employer is liable only to the extent of
workers' compensation benefits unless the
injurious act was directed or intended by
the employer. Id. at 895. Without such
direct responsibility, the employer "could
not be required to respond as the offending
employee's superior." Stewart v. CMI
Corp., 740 P.2d 1340, 1341 n. 1 (Utah 1987)
(dictum). See A. Larson, 2A Workmen's
Compensation Law §§ 68.21, 68.23 & n.
37, 68.33 & n. 49.1 (1987).
[5,6] According to Mounteer's own allegations, he was indisputably injured by acment." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988) (emphasis added).
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cident3 arising out of or in the course of
his employment He was thus clearly
barred by the statute from bringing a negligence action at law against either Larsen
or UP & L. His allegations concerning
Larsen's intentional conduct, however,
were sufficient to state a direct tort claim
against her that was not barred by the
exclusivity provision in section 35-1-60, but
she was not made a defendant, and UP & h
cannot be liable at law for Larsen's intentional acts merely by operation of vicarious
liability.4 If Mounteer had alleged facts
supporting an inference that UP & L directed or intended Larsen's injurious acts,
he would have sufficiently stated a claim
against UP & L directly, and the statute
would likewise afford UP & L no shield
from liability in damages. "A complaint, to
survive a motion to dismiss, must do more
than merety afiege intentional injury as ati
exception to the general exclusiveness rule;
it must allege facts that add up to a deliberate intent [by the employer] to bring
about injury." 2A A. Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law § 68.14 (1987). In the
absence of any such factual allegations,
however, the trial court correctly concluded
as a matter of law that Mounteer failed to
state a claim against UP & L.
The order of the trial court dismissing
Mounteer's complaint is, therefore, affirmed.
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur.

James R. WESTON, Plaintiff, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Pat L. WESTON, Defendant, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant
No. 870561-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 4, 1989.

Husband commenced divorce proceeding. The First District Court, Cache County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., divided marital property, and appeals were taken. The
Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that:
(1) husband's stock in closely held family
corporations was properly valued, and (2)
husband could be ordered to make cash
payments to wife rather than in-kind distribution of stock.
Affirmed and remanded.

1. Divorce <s=>253(3)
Trial court could value husband's stock
in closely held corporations, in dividing
marital estate in divorce action, at amounts
to which husband and husband's expert
testified, but without providing discount
for lack of marketability of stock in closely
held corporations.
2. Divorce <s=>252.3(l, 5)
Marital assets consisting of stock in
closely held family corporation can be dis-

3. Mounteer summarily contends that his injuries are not compensable as resulting from an
"accident" under section 35-1-45 (1987) because
they did not arise from any "physical contact,
strain, exertion or other physical cause" but
from mental anguish and an exacerbated nervous condition resulting from Larsen's actions.
However, as the Utah Supreme Court held in
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 22
(Utah 1986), an "accident" for purposes of workers' compensation "is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the cause
or the result of the injury." Whether Mouflteer's injury arose from a physical or mental
cause is, therefore, irrelevant to the issue of
whether it occurred "by accident" within the
meaning of the statute.

4. Commenting on- Thompson v. Maimonides
Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308
(1982), in which an employee's causes of action
imputing liability to the employer for a co-employee's defamation, negligence, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress were dismissed
for this same reason, Professor Larson notes:
'This is true even if some of the harms resulting
are of a kind for which compensation affords
no remedy, such as loss of reputation, humiliation and embarrassment. The psychological injuries such as depression or psychotic reactions
would, of course, still be compensable under the
compensation act." 2A A. Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law § 68.23 n. 37 (1987).
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justnal Commission of Utah
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24
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(Describe fully the events, give full details on all factors which led or contributed to the accident)

25.
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26.
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F^ry

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Workmen's Compensation Department
P.O. Box 899 Room 1109
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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Pprry Mrmnt<>ftr
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>
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Date of Injury

Decemberr1984

2.

Has claimant been discharged from treatment?

No

If so, when?
3.

LIGHT DUTY?
If not, when will claimant be able to resume employment? REGULAR?

4.

Will claimant be able to perform his regular work on said date^

5. Will additional treatment or operative procedure improve patient's condition?

£es

If so, state what additional treatment or procedure is recommended?
Continued psychotherapy to behavioral modification
6.

Has there been further operative procedure since last report?

No

If so, what?
7.

Has injury resulted in any permanent disability? YPS If so, please estimate the
disability as a percentage of loss of the member or part of member involved. 1007o
100 %

8.

If disability still continues, state what has caused disability beyond the date
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by stress resulting fron paranoid personality trigged by re-narks made to
him by management personell.
Remarks:
(State any exceptional medical facts, whether compensation is received from other
sources, and any other information which you may deem of value.

Attending Physician
P.O. Box 570
Price, Utah

84501

PHYSICIAN'S. REPORT AND BILL TO
P. 0 . Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 841*0
(801) 53S=*+23

ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Worker's Compensation Department

ame of Employer: Emery Mining Company

Address: P. 0. Box 310, Huntington, Utah S452S

ame of Injured
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Date of
Service
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10-14-86
10-15-86
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11-11-86
11-18-86
11-24-86
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12-8-86
12-12-86
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ICDA
Code

Procedure
Code
90801
90844
90844
90844
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°rH44

Date of Injury

Type of
Service

309.81
309.81
309.81
309.81
296.32
296.32
296.32
296.32
296.32
296.32
296.32
296.32
?96.3?
?Qf,.^2

19.,

Charges
150.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
RS.00
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309.81
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PHYSICIAN'S REPORT AND BILL TO
P. O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

^ Y MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Worker's Compensation Department

(801) 633*tt«3

774-
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^ame of Employer: Emery Mining Company

Address: P. 0. Box 310, Hunrington, Utah S452S
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Procedure
Code

ICDA
Code

12-22-86
12-29-86,
1-6-87
1-9-87
1-13-87
1-20-87
1-26-87
2-2-87

90844
90844
90844
90844
90844

309.81
309.81
309.81
3Q9.81
29.6,.32
296.32

2-9-87
2-23-8"?
3-2-87

90844
^0*44
90844
90844
90844
90844

Date of
Service

3-17-87
3-30-87
4-6-87

90844

90844
90844

Date of Injury

Type of
Service

19.

Charges

Psyr.hr. fhprflPV

85.00
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as nn
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85.00
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_8iJ}n_
PS-nn

296.37

TOTAL CHARGES
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NATURE OF INJURY
Diagnosis

309.81

Post-Traumatic Stress

296.32

Major Depression

disorder

Describe Treatment

/ere X-Rays taken by some other Doctor?
)ate Patient was able to resume work
atient pronounced as cured on
_
5 Patient capable of doing same work as before injury?
ny permanent injury? Describe futiy
Dated, this

Was a prescription given?.
19
19
If not, why?
_
day' of..

19.,

ENERGY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY

TELEPHONE (801) 972-7561
1600 WEST 2200 SOUTH
P.O. BOX 27158
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84127-0158

April 20, 1987

Ralph Vanderlinden, Ph.D.
P.O. Box 570
Price, UT 84501
Re:

Percy Mounteer

Dear Dr. Vanderlinden:
Energy Mutual Insurance Company cannot accept liability
for the attached claims at this time. We have requested a
signed medical release from Mr. Mounteer to further evaluate
his case. However, we have not received anything from Mr.
Mounteer at this time.
Before Energy Mutual Insurance Company can accept any
liability for Mr. Mounteer's industrial accident, we will
need to reviev; any and all complete medical records
attributed to the incident. As mentioned, we are waiting
for an authorized medical release from Mr. Mounteer at which
time we can properly request medical records and
documentation.
We regret that we cannot be of service to you at this
time.
Respectfully,
Karin Jentzsch
Industrial Claims

Attachments
CC: UP&L Mining Division
eb

ENERGY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY

TELEPHONE (801) 972-7561
1600 WEST 2200 SOUTH
P.O. fcO\ 27158
SALT LAKE CITN

UTAH 84127-0158

April 27, 1987

Percy N.ounteer
Huntington, UT
Subject:

8452S

Request for Medical Information Release

Daar Percy:
In order to properly evaluate and monitor your Worker's
Compensation claim, we respectfully request that ycu sign the
attache." release of medical information. A stamped
self-addressed envelope has been furnished for your
convenience.
If' you have any questions, please feel free to contact our
office at phone number 972-7507,
Sincerely,
Karin Jentzsch
Industrial Claims

Enc .
CC:1 Lee Hofeling
Don ChiIds
eb

NERGY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY

TELEPHONE (801) 972 7561
1600 WEST 2200 SOUTH
P.O. BOX 27158
SA1 T I AKE CITY

I ITAi i 84127-0158

June 3 f

T

ezcy Mounteer
P.O. Bux 903Huntings or TT^
Re:

8 4 528

Industrial Accident of 10/7/86

Energy Mutual Insurance Company cannot accept liability
for your industrial incident of 10/7/86 at this time. We
requested a medical release from you on April 27, 1987.
This was to gather medical information to evaluate this
case. As of today's date we have not received the medical
release,
If comp 1 ete medica 1 information is sei It tc i is
then re-evaluate your industrial claim.

v, = • ; :i 1 1

We regret that we cannot be of service to you at tl li s
t ime,
Respectfully,
Karin Jentzsch
Industria1 C1a ims

Don Chiles
Lee Hofeling
Industrial Commission of Utah
Ra1ph Vanderlinden, Ph D,
eb

ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATED r I.
M. GALE LEMMON (Bar No. :3 > )
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State Street, Suite :n
Salt Lake City, Utah 841.11.
Telephone: (80] ) 533-32:2
I N D U S T R I A L COMMISSION OF UTAH
I'WRC K Mi; JNTEBR,
Claimant,
v

CLAIM FOR PROTECTION
OF RIGHTS

UTAH POWEh * i,iGHT C O M P A N Y ,
and ELECTRIC M U T U A L BENEFIT
AS SOCI AT ION, its I:;: s\:i •*? r ,

zr~F~~,~ ~ r — - •
*0
i

MS

Defenda*" ,
v

' :irouHn

*o ^-^ .rneys, K o o e : :

("MounteeP'TTsy and

ou

-

*_ . •

r

-.ereby files this Claim for Protection -:i lights and alleges

M o 12 n t e e r sustained a n i n j u r y i n a n i n c i d e n t o n
or a b o u t October 6 f 1983 a t t h e Des-Be-Dove Mine in Emery
C ::)i int] ?

Sta I: a of Uta h .
2

Mounteer at t h e time of t h e incident w a ^ ; «

a

state of heightened emotiona] agitation and upset as x result
• ::: f h :I s i n , ol vement :i n th =; Wi 3 bi :i r ::i M i n s 3 i sa ster • At
•

of t h e incident, 'Utah Power a n d Light Company
employee

("UP&L

Niky Larson ( "Larson" ) i investigated Mounteer f o r

suspected u s e of d r ugs a t th » :n request ::: I: UIF &L

I >a rs> m

slandered Mounteer in a l l e g i n g w i t h i n t h e hearing of over 800
" is] 3 i ::) M employees tha t M o u n t e e r w a s on dr u g s .

As a result of
APPENDIX C

said slander Mounteer developed post-dramatic 'stress disorder
.in"'

i l"

'ii"'i "

i p . "i»l"i,,«

«I

"

l

idiie .i . . | 'enuarieiii-., •
<

f
I-

and total

'*-->at>.^:.

r

»

C

f

',' ,,"

"\

I . n u u a i e e r ' s w ? q ^ a t t h e d a t e of in™1.' • *- w a s

our.t *<:-r'-: d a t e o f r . *

married

o. -

dependent

*3 .

-

jDO n hi r

*. :

-

, Apr:

>--

*r a u e

, jpoort«

t

Commission
- <cc;K]fl

ri< - .
- •-,« i -i

ii ,1 !„..[,: ui, e r'AL.'jl,1,

-

::jLenaL>
-

111 I'liijl

* ,-

*: - p i ^ i e - \ , i ^dns* - ~"

a

' M . U I I ' LW HI i1.1.

:ign:.b

^«"cden.*
"111,1

: o,
•*

current

111. I y l.i j iievfc\J

by

the claimant not to be an industrial accident under the laws
Q£

j:|le s tate of Utah,

However, said incident has been ho-«.

Lu oe a compensable accident by LII»• 111 an " ouiit i.ii: Appeals
under a decision reported as Mount.eer vs. Utah Power & Light
C o m p a n y , I il ' llleah Adv.iJV'.o Report" /'111 I Utah C o u r t of A.ppeals,
May

11- l'lil'D,

I" kninteei h a s .tiled a P e t i t i o n t o r a W I L L of

Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah in that case, and * 1
the event t,hat sa i d Pet ition f;or ." Writ of Certiorar i i n
denied ui Jiat the Utah Supreme Court upholds the rjlmy

J

the Appellate Court.! Mounteer will file a claim for Worker's

DATED this $

day of .Tune, l^fl*
/

0>L- '7,
M. GALE LEMMON
Attorney for Claimant
835PL

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
L c e r tify

_ J" <• ^O

th.it on

[J

, 19 J, ''

a ropy ol Lhu J t t a e h e d ^ ^ ^ ^
was mailed to the following persona at the following
III I I I I I I ' l l ! 1 !

1

1H

I

I

"ilf

!MIII|.I,II,II

|

Ill 1 HI

ML Gale Lemmon, Atty ,
311 South State Street, Ste
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
1/Energy Mutual Ins.
P.O. Box 27008
Salt Lake C1 ty, Ut ah

2 iiO

841 27-0008

By

Carol Hawkins

PROOF OF SERVICE

PAUL H. PROCTOR, attorney for Utah Power & Light Company,
certifies that on October M
I ii'espi n'liiit'in u «i>j"'i i.

1090, tnur copies or vhr

,.ei J'eij upon u n

nppc: I. 1 dim:

Brief

lail ing true

same U. s. mail first class, postage prepaid, "
Robert B , Sykes , IKsq ,
Phillip Kent Card, Esq,
Sykes & Vilos, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
311 South State' Street, #24 0
Sa] t Lake city , I Itah 84111
DATED this 8th day of October, 1 990.
• UTAHxPSjTER & LIGHT. COMPANY

Paul H

Proctor

